The political context of John Mulgan’s Greek wartime life and death by Brown, Martyn
iii
J O U R N A L   O F
NEW ZEALAND STUDIES
NS 10 2011
Contents
John Newton
‘With the back of an axe’: Reading the Group Architects  .......................  1
Bernard Cadogan
A Sphinx with a Riddle: The Political Thought and Constitutionalism 
of Sir George Grey  ......................................................................................................  19
Vincent O’Malley
Manufacturing Chiefly Consent? James Busby and the Role of 
Rangatira in the Pre-Colonial Era  ......................................................................  33
Te Maire Tau
I-ngā-rā-o-mua  ..............................................................................................................  45
Giselle Larcombe
Religion and Diaspora: Community Creation in Nineteenth-Century 
New Zealand, the Case of Antoine Garin and the Catholics of 
Howick and Nelson  .....................................................................................................  63
Martyn Brown
The Political Context of John Mulgan’s Greek Wartime Life 
and Death  ........................................................................................................................  89
Paul Callister
The Construction of Ethnicity and ‘Belonging’ in New Zealand: 
Where We Have Come From and Where We Might Be Going  ..............  115
Matthew Cunningham
Conservative Protest or Conservative Radicalism? The New Zealand 
Legion in a Comparative Context, 1930-1935  ................................................  139
Gareth Phipps
Bringing Our Boy Home: The Tomb of the Unknown Warrior and 
Contemporary War Remembrance  .......................................................................  159
Reviews
Margaret Sparrow, Abortion Then & Now: New Zealand Abortion 
Stories from 1940 to 1980  .......................................................................................  185
Reviewed by Barbara Brookes
Journal of New Zealand Studies
8988
The Political Context of 
John Mulgan’s Greek Wartime Life 
and Death1
MARTYN BROWN
Introduction
In late March 1965, distinguished New Zealand diplomat Joseph (J.V.) Wilson 
offered Paul Day, who was then writing a biography of John Mulgan, some 
materials that needed ‘circumspect handling both because of their content 
and because of the circumstances in which they were written’. The items 
in question were letters sent to the Wellington-based diplomat Wilson in 
response to a request he had made to the soldier Mulgan in January 1945 
for an assessment of the political situation in liberated Greece. The two 
had known each before the war, when they were part of the New Zealand 
delegation to the League of Nations. Mulgan’s letters were typed just a few 
days before his death during the night of 25/26 April in Cairo. Wilson’s 
caution – he wanted any extracts to be confined to those ‘for the purposes 
of your biography’2 – shows his desire to avoid engaging with the political 
nature of the letters. He was also respecting Mulgan’s request to limit 
circulation because, as Mulgan wrote to Wilson in 1945, ‘as an army officer 
I’m not officially free to write or express my views without censorship’.3 Day, 
for his part, reversed an earlier request for making copies, in deference to 
Wilson’s ‘reservations about reproduction’. He also thought ‘it most unlikely 
that I shall wish to quote from these documents’, but would rely on other 
sources to build a picture of the ‘Greek political scene’. The biographer 
thought, ‘The account of the Greek political scene is interesting, though 
generalized.’ 4 This short exchange provides a place of embarkation for this 
paper.
 John Mulgan’s death has been attributed in the literature to his 
disillusionment following German reprisals against Greek civilians, which his 
sabotage work provoked, and the effects of his compensation work in Athens 
following liberation: ‘Overwrought, he killed himself before he was thirty-
five’.5 This study shows Mulgan’s death deserves reconsideration, because 
people at the time sought explanations other than the official verdict of 
suicide. As such, this paper offers both a wider perspective on John Mulgan 
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the individual, and a revisionist treatment of New Zealand diplomatic war 
history. For historians of Anglo-Greek wartime relations, the use of New 
Zealand archives and manuscripts shows how seemingly peripheral sources 
can contribute to a much-discussed area – one which has not, up to now, 
included New Zealand.
Historical background
Mulgan arrived in enemy-occupied Greece on 12 September 1943. He was 
a member of Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE), a special forces 
organization which operated in all war theatres. Although SOE Greece had 
a number of New Zealanders seconded from the New Zealand forces in its 
ranks already, Mulgan was in fact in the British army when he volunteered 
to join the organization. His first period in Greece ended in November 1944, 
shortly after liberation. His time was spent in sabotage missions (especially 
against trains). Like his SOE colleagues in Greece this involved working with 
the local partisans. However, he did not face the same political complexities 
that most of them did because he only had to deal with one of the competing 
resistance groups in his area. The highly charged political dynamics of 
wartime Greece had led to divisions within the British politico-military 
establishment over their Greek policy. If Mulgan had arrived in Greece just 
a few months earlier his commanding officer would have been Brigadier 
Eddie Myers and not Chris Woodhouse (the British SOE personality often 
mentioned or cited in biographies of Mulgan). Myers had been removed 
from his command because he clashed with the British Foreign Office over 
how the volatile situation in occupied Greece should be handled. Mulgan 
shared something with Myers in that both were critical of British policies. 
Mulgan however, kept his views largely confined to himself or personal 
correspondents; Myers went all the way up to Winston Churchill with his. 
Myers never returned to occupied Greece.
 Following liberation, Mulgan went to Cairo but accepted an administration 
assignment that required him to return to Athens in January 1945. While 
the literature has stressed that his work in Athens concerned compensation 
activities, this study shows Mulgan had an involvement in the still festering 
politics of wartime Greece during this period, as well as looking out for 
British interests. In late April he again travelled to the Egyptian capital, 
where he was found dead on 26 April, just a few days before his requested 
transfer to the New Zealand Second Division was to be actioned. It was also 
shortly after he wrote to J.V. Wilson. These are the basic facts regarding 
Mulgan’s service with SOE in Greece. The following is a brief contextual 
overview of the historical background to wartime Greece and the period 
immediately preceding it.
Pre-War Greece and the Greek government in exile
On 4 August 1936, General Ioannis Metaxas used the perceived threat of a 
Communist revolution, and the support of the Greek monarch, King George 
II, to establish a Greek dictatorship. The dictatorship had the trappings of 
National Socialist ideology. The confiscation and public burning of books 
by Greek and foreign authors such as George Bernard Shaw, Goethe and 
Freud took place, as well as censorship of Greek classics.6 State Security was 
managed by Sub-Minister Constantine Maniadakis. His expertise in social 
control through the use of torture and other means gained him a reputation 
for grim efficiency. Just how widely the regime cast its repressive net can 
be judged by the extensive use of forced public Declarations of Repentance. 
The declarations were obtained from alleged enemies of the state and then 
published. In his 2004 work Greek historian Andre Gerolymatos has noted 
how one Metaxist minister stated the number of declarations reached 57,000 
– four times the membership of the pre-war Greek Communist Party. This 
‘must be attributed to the excessive zeal of the police, who often seized 
individuals merely suspected of communist sympathies’.7 Maniadakis’ 
originality led him to establish a completely bogus Communist Party 
structure in parallel to the genuine one. The resulting confusion weakened 
the communists but the experience they gained in surviving placed them in 
a prime position to grow and influence the wartime resistance.
 As the Germans advanced triumphantly through mainland Greece in April 
1941, the Greek government, including the new Greek premier Emmanuel 
Tsouderos (Metaxas died in January 1941 and his successor committed 
suicide shortly after German victory was assured), and King George II, 
fled to Crete. Included in their ranks were Maniadakis and other Metaxist 
ministers. Maniadakis continued his state responsibilities on Crete – the 
battle for which holds a prominent place in New Zealand history and 
popular memory. Opposition from the local people against Maniadakis and 
the still-enforced Metaxist measures led to protests to the Greek king and 
his administration. Such pressure resulted in several ministers (including 
Maniadakis) being removed from the island.8 Following the loss of the 
Greek mainland and Crete to the invading German army, the government 
and king operated out of London and Cairo and enjoyed the support of the 
British government, especially Winston Churchill. To one degree or other, 
the Metaxists remained in the government-in-exile up until May 1942, when 
they ‘were removed from key jobs’.9 But Metaxist sympathizers remained 
inside the Greek administration-in-exile and within the armed forces they 
raised in the Middle East. For example, as late as August 1944, American 
intelligence reported that the main unit in the Greek government armed 
forces was singing Metaxist songs as it arrived in Italy.10
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 The armed forces raised by the Greek establishment in the Middle East 
were wracked by internal political division. Groups of soldiers with various 
and often conflicting ideological inclinations – for example, Republicans, 
Monarchists, Communists and Metaxists – vied for influence within the 
forces. The leftist Anti-Fascist Military Organization (ASO) was the largest 
faction. It challenged the continuation of King George and his administration. 
Their views were expressed through agitation, the most spectacular being 
the mutinies in the Greek armed forces of the Middle East in early 1943 
and 1944. The mutinies led to the fall of two Greek premiers and to several 
reorganizations of the government. When Mulgan arrived in Greece during 
late 1943, Emmanuel Tsouderos was still Greek premier in the government-
in-exile. He resigned during the mutiny of April 1944 and was followed in 
a matter of days by his successor, Sofoklis Venizelos. George Papandreou 
then became premier and was still in power at the time of Greek liberation 
later that year. The period of liberation brought the British Army and the 
Greek government-in-exile into direct contact with the anti-Axis resistance 
forces of the EAM (National Liberation Front) and its military arm ELAS 
(National Liberation Army) in Greece. Open warfare erupted between them 
in December 1944. It lasted into the new year, when Mulgan returned to 
Athens to undertake his final SOE work.
Inside wartime Greece
The failed Greek campaign of 1941 led to the trauma of Axis (Italian, 
German and Bulgarian) occupation of the country for more than three 
years. Within Greece, various resistance forces emerged. Each had its own 
political alignment. The largest group would challenge the Greek monarch, 
his government-in-exile, and thereby the major power that sponsored them, 
Great Britain. This was the leftist EAM and its military arm ELAS. 
However, the pragmatic requirements of fighting the Axis enemy meant that 
the British provided arms and supplies to any partisan movement which 
would combat the Axis. Defeating the enemy was the immediate objective. 
The longer-term aim was ensuring British influence in Greece. While the 
former meant tolerating EAM/ELAS, the latter entailed minimizing their 
political influence during the occupation and also at the time of liberation. 
By the end of his first few months in occupied Greece, Chris Woodhouse, 
Mulgan’s commanding officer in Greece, concluded that the rank and file 
of EAM/ELAS were not aware that the Greek Communist Party secretly 
controlled their organization.
 In terms of political preferences, Britain supported the right wing EDES 
(National Republican Greek League). Despite its name, which seemingly 
contradicts acceptance of the monarch, EDES was persuaded to change its 
original social reform agenda through British promises of support. Chris 
Woodhouse would also write, after the war, that its leader, Napoleon Zervas, 
‘had only been induced to take the field by strong pressure, amounting almost 
to blackmail’.11 Despite British attempts at limiting their influence, EAM/
ELAS successfully liquidated a number of smaller resistance groups as it 
strove to dominate the resistance movement inside occupied Greece. The 
most notable of these groups was National and Social Liberation (EKKA). 
Mulgan would play an unwitting part in that episode.
 Within Greece then, it was the British Liaison Officers (BLOs) like 
Mulgan who engaged at the coal face with the various political forces. This 
involved both political and military responsibilities.
John Mulgan and Anglo-Greek wartime historiography
John Mulgan figures as an incidental character in political analyses of 
Anglo-Greek relations and in the wider international relations publication 
record. This is a realm not examined to any meaningful extent by New 
Zealand historians, who have placed New Zealand on the extreme boundary 
of the interplay between the exigencies of war, conflicting internal Greek 
ideological forces, and the strategic interests of the major powers – Britain, 
the Soviet Union and the United States. Mulgan’s role does not attract any 
notable discussion, although his views on the ever-diminishing effectiveness 
of the Greek andartes (partisan) forces in Report on Experience 12 are cited 
by the Greek history scholar Mark Mazower in Inside Hitler’s Greece.13 
Similarly, M.R.D. Foot, one of the early SOE historians, also cites Report 
on Experience and concludes that Mulgan was ‘perceptive’ and ‘a New 
Zealand scholar of broad sympathies and a reflective mind, who did marvels 
as a train saboteur, and was appalled at the way that two men who were 
hard-bitten enough [that is, EAM/ELAS functionaries] could dominate the 
life of a hill village’.14 In an examination of the relationship between the 
British Military Mission and their American counterparts, Richard Clogg, the 
historian appointed to write an official history of SOE in Greece, quotes a 
report from Mulgan, where he states a preference for working with American 
over American-Greek (that is, Americans with Greek heritage) personnel. 
Clogg also describes how British attempts at blunting American criticism 
of their handling of the Greek situation led to an American intelligence 
research analyst being sent to Mulgan’s area so that he could see the effective 
working relationship Mulgan had established there with ELAS.15 That same 
relationship is described in the memoirs of Nicolas Hammond, an SOE 
colleague of Mulgan’s, as fitting in with the ELAS strategy to gain political 
leverage with the British: ‘It was a regular gambit of ELAS to have one 
such model area’. Hammond pointed out that Mulgan’s success was known 
at senior levels: ‘At this time, ELAS GHQ always pointed to Mulgan’s area 
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as the one in which ELAS co-operation was freely given, because Mulgan 
treated ELAS properly’.16
 Unfortunately, Stefanos Sarafis, the senior ELAS commander at the 
ELAS GHQ that Hammond refers to, only fleetingly mentions Mulgan in 
his published recollections. And then only as someone who assisted him 
on a flight from Greece. A footnote mistakenly calls Mulgan an Australian 
but correctly identifies him as the author of Report on Experience.17 There 
is no discussion of the man nor of the views he put forward in that work.
 Mulgan’s military effectiveness and positive working relationship with 
ELAS may have caught the attention of political actors during the occupation 
and subsequently historians, but ELAS was not the only resistance group he 
encountered. One recent study has highlighted how, even in his seemingly 
exceptional circumstances, Greek internecine terror touched him. The study 
is by Argyrios Mamarelis, who has used Public Records Office archives at 
Kew to dispel some of the many popular stories concerning the death of 
independent partisan leader Colonel Dimitrios Psarros and the massacre of 
his men.
 Psarros headed the National and Social Liberation (EKKA) resistance 
group. In April 1944, Psarros and partisans of EKKA’s military arm 
were disarmed by ELAS and subsequently ‘murdered under mysterious 
circumstances’.18 On two previous occasions, ELAS had disarmed the 
same group, but with no subsequent killing. Thus, British Liaison Officers, 
including Mulgan, thought little of the signs that a third occasion was about 
to occur. Mulgan sent a telegram to SOE HQ in Cairo: ‘The EKKA/ELAS 
trouble is apparently not serious. I expect it to blow over’. Indeed, Mulgan’s 
more senior colleagues in Greece thought the trouble of maintaining EKKA 
as a minor separate body was not worth the effort.19 Through his dismissal of 
the tension, the New Zealander had unwittingly contributed to the massacre. 
His telegram, together with other communications involving Mulgan, is used 
by Mamarelis to argue that there was no British conspiracy concerning 
EKKA. However, as discussed later, the fate of EKKA would revisit John 
Mulgan in Athens during early 1945 when he was managing recompense 
to Greeks who had assisted SOE.
 Mulgan, then, receives most attention in the extant Anglo-Greek literature 
because of his critical views on the partisan movement, his individual success 
and its use by the competing political players in Greece. Other than this, he 
attracts brief mention – probably because he simply was not high enough in 
the decision-making circles to participate in the strategic policies and actions 
as colleagues like Nicholas Hammond and Chris Woodhouse were. It is 
New Zealand biographers who introduce an international relations dimension 
to the discussion. They do this by quoting Mulgan and also by making brief 
mention of a communication he had with a government that was not one of 
the major powers involved in Greece – Peter Fraser’s New Zealand wartime 
administration. Mulgan’s critical comments on British foreign policy have 
been ignored in the mainstream Anglo-Greek literature, while the connection 
with Fraser’s administration has never been fully explored. Similarly, the 
nature of Mulgan’s compensation work in Athens has been treated solely 
as a debilitating encounter with human misery. This view has ignored 
the political legacy that accompanied the experience, as well as Mulgan’s 
involvement in the murky and charged atmosphere of Athens.
John Mulgan – New Zealand biographical material
Biographical studies on John Mulgan have focused primarily on the short but 
varied course of his entire life. As a natural consequence, his time with SOE 
Greece receives a restricted analysis. The one item in the publication record 
that focuses entirely on Mulgan’s Greek-related experiences is Dean Parker’s 
play, Greek Fire.20 Although the play refers to the political background of 
the partisan warfare in Greece and intelligence operatives in Cairo, it does 
not provide specific details about the national actors and the international 
relations context and events of the day. New Zealand biographers of 
Mulgan, to varying degrees, discuss his dislike of the Greek communists, 
his revulsion at, and feeling of responsibility for the Axis reprisals, his 
often-applauded sabotage work and his criticism of British foreign policy.21 
A paragraph in Vincent O’Sullivan’s biography shows that, at least in April 
1945, after the Germans had left Greece and Britain had returned with 
its Greek émigré-sponsored administration, Mulgan had some sort of link 
to the New Zealand government (in the form of J.V. Wilson, a diplomat): 
‘Wilson asked for Mulgan’s views on the Greek situation’. The latter wrote 
a report that O’Sullivan estimates to be ‘more than 4,000 words in reply’. 
Mulgan’s views show that he was an independent thinker about Greece: ‘His 
concluding views were cogent and unfashionable – Britain should get out, 
and an international military government preside until democratic processes 
could work’.22 James McNeish refers to the same communication but simply 
notes it as one of the letters written just before Mulgan’s death in Cairo and 
does not identify Mulgan’s correspondent.23 The background and motivation 
for the report are not discussed by either biographer. What makes the 
communication more intriguing is the sparseness in the literature over New 
Zealand’s stance of neutrality toward Anglo-Greek relations. This stance is 
briefly explained in F.L.W. Wood’s official history as, ‘. . . an unwillingness 
to take sides in Greek politics as well as a desire to get the NZEF home 
as soon as fighting had ceased’.24 The resolve to bring the NZEF home ran 
counter to a British request for New Zealand garrison troops after the end 
of hostilities and for a small detachment of the Dominion’s troops to enter 
Athens with the returning British. These requests were received and turned 
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down before Wellington contacted Mulgan. Thus it appears that there was 
continued deliberation in Wellington over the Greek question.
1944 – Time of liberation and the uneasy Anglo-Greek 
alliance collapse
In October 1944, British troops arrived in Greece on the heels of the 
Germans, who had vacated the country. Such a development had long been 
anticipated by the Allies and the Germans, as the advancing Soviet armies 
to the north would have trapped the Nazi forces in the Balkan peninsular. 
Churchill’s fear of a coup d’état by EAM/ELAS had led to the planning of 
Operation MANNA to quickly establish the Greek government in exile in 
Athens, with the support of British and loyal Greek troops, in the vacuum 
left by the Germans. After several tense months, fighting erupted between 
ELAS and the allied British, EDES, and exiled Greek government forces. 
EDES were quickly overwhelmed by ELAS and were evacuated to the island 
of Corfu by British warships. The spark that ignited the powder keg was 
the Athens police opening fire on an EAM demonstration in Constitution 
Square. On 5 December, the New Zealand Herald reported: ‘For 25 minutes 
Greek police poured a withering fire from machine guns, tommy-guns and 
mortars and light anti-tank guns into the ranks of unarmed demonstrators 
of the EAM (Left Wing party)’.25 Initial fighting between the Athens police 
and ELAS soon escalated. The British joined in as ELAS got the upper 
hand. The New Zealand press reports were dominated by accounts of use of 
British advanced weaponry and airpower in the city of Athens, the incident 
in Constitution Square and the return of a monarch and government with 
questionable credibility to govern in a democracy. A small piece on ELAS 
taking hostages and carrying out executions on 12 December was an early 
indication of the atrocities associated with their actions.26
 Britain and her Greek allies eventually prevailed, and ELAS was forced 
out of the city. On 12 February 1945, the Varkiza Agreement was signed by 
the parties. The terms of the Agreement included the lifting of martial law, 
amnesty, purging of the civil service and security services, demobilization of 
partisans and the establishment of a national army and restoration of political 
liberties. However, ELAS still controlled a major part of rural Greece. Before 
the Agreement was signed, right-wing paramilitary groups were active and 
seemingly supported by the victors. On 15 January, The Times reported how 
the collaborationist ‘X’ organization joined with EDES and other groups in 
a mass demonstration (the article did not mention the organization’s former 
association with the occupiers). The demonstration included chanting in 
support of the British commander, General Scobie, and ubiquitous portraits 
of the Greek King.27 Chris Woodhouse would write in one of his histories 
of Greece that X had no link to the British during the occupation, although 
its leader, George Grivas, like many other officers, had been approached 
by British agents to take up resistance against the Axis (that is, to provide 
a counter to ELAS power). Woodhouse has written about Grivas and his 
group during the early post-liberation period thus: ‘a gang of thugs . . . 
to fight the similar gangs of Communists in the streets of Athens’.28 The 
X organization would extend its killing to a wide range of political opponents 
in the future. In hindsight, the Varkiza Agreement was only a temporary and 
partial respite in the political turmoil of Greece.29 The temporary upheaval 
that started in late December brought repercussions to the government of 
Peter Fraser. A large number of New Zealand troops had fought in Greece 
and/or been assisted by the local population in a most compassionate way. 
Such a direct interaction made for a strong popular response to events in 
December 1944.
Wellington government and New Zealand popular protest 
against British actions in Athens during December 1944
During December 1944, the New Zealand government received messages 
of protest from throughout the country, decrying what was often called 
‘British intervention’ in Greece. Most were from trade unions and Labour 
Party branches. Unsurprisingly, the Communist Party of New Zealand also 
registered its objections.30 The press carried stories about the protests 31 as 
well as reporting a petition signed by 248 soldiers at Burnham Camp that 
was sent to Peter Fraser.32 Fraser ruled out the possibility of Dominion troops 
entering the battle raging in Athens, and issued a statement to the effect that: 
‘There are no New Zealand troops in Greece and no likelihood whatever 
of New Zealand troops being sent to Greece’.33 This was a decision made 
months previously and noted in the extant history. Under enormous pressure, 
Fraser was making public a previously confidential policy decision.
 The domestic protest, together with Churchill’s response to a question 
in the House of Commons on 14 December, prompted Peter Fraser to send 
a telegram of protest to London. Churchill’s statement was clearly the 
predominant trigger. The British Prime Minister had stated that the British 
dominions had been kept informed of high policy through a ‘continued 
succession of telegrams which are sent from this country’ but that certain 
circumstances require swift and forced ‘executive measures’ which precluded 
extensive consultation. Churchill ended thus: ‘I could rightfully say that we 
have received from the Dominion Governments no indications that they 
dissent from the action we have been compelled to take’.34 Churchill was 
referring to the standard practice of distributing information through British 
diplomatic channels. The intimation was that Britain had the full support 
of the commonwealth – including New Zealand.
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 On 20 December, Fraser sent his telegram of protest to London. He told 
the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that, while he had been trying 
to contain criticism concerning British actions, Churchill’s statement made 
it necessary for him to communicate a formal position. Besides reiterating 
criticisms of the Greek monarch he had apparently made at the Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting in early 1944, he requested a clear statement as to the 
outcomes London was trying to achieve in Greece. He balanced this request 
with a repudiation of those who would ‘impose their will by force of arms’ 
[probably a reference to EAM/ELAS]. The traditional practice of publicly 
maintaining commonwealth solidarity while permitting private disagreement 
explains some of Fraser’s telegram as well as his behaviour in the New 
Zealand parliament. In his communication of 20 December, Fraser clearly 
showed he was not willing to publicly break with Britain, nor was he going 
to permit the Greek crisis to be discussed in the country’s pre-eminent 
political forum. He told London that: ‘We have endeavoured to prevent any 
considerable volume of hostile criticism’ and that he had prevented questions 
being raised about Greece in the New Zealand Parliament. Fraser highlighted 
the presence of the trade union movement and Labour Party members in 
the protest. He did not mention the petition from the soldiers at Burnham. 
This could possibly have been too embarrassing for him to mention – to 
tell Churchill about popular civilian protest was one thing, to acknowledge 
protest emanating from the troops was another. Fraser then attributed the 
cause of the protest to British support for the Greek monarchy. Indeed, 
besides Greece, he mentioned Yugoslavia and Italy: ‘the fact is plain that 
the majority of the people of their countries do not want them [that is, the 
former monarchs] back to reign over them’. Fraser concluded his telegram 
by asking for a clear assurance that Britain was not undertaking to restore 
monarchies in the newly liberated countries.35
 Fraser was following established commonwealth behaviour in not publicly 
criticizing British policies. He alluded to an earlier discussion he had with 
Anthony Eden in May (undoubtedly when he attended the Prime Ministers’ 
Conference in London) when he said that supporting the reestablishment of 
unpopular European monarchies in new liberated countries was ‘a mistake 
of the first magnitude’. The form of postwar government, he said (and 
highlighted Greece), should be decided through elections. The New Zealand 
Prime Minister’s words indicate that New Zealand policy toward Greece had 
apparently germinated during 1944. Furthermore, Fraser specifically named 
only one of the parties in the Greek political scene – the king. EAM/ELAS, 
and possibly other armed political groups, are relegated to those who would 
‘impose their will by force of arms’. In arguing against the return of the 
king, New Zealand was showing some independence from official British 
policy. In this respect, it is in tune with the published communications 
in the extant literature which shows that the government avoided sending 
New Zealand troops to Greece. At the same time, it conflicts with the 
neutralist view expressed in the literature. Fraser had indicted that he was 
not supporting the king. His criticism of the monarch was more pointed 
than his criticism of the resistance groups and paramilitary forces: whereas 
he wanted to dispense with George II completely, he merely attacked the 
latter’s means of attaining power. Having said all of this, what constitutes 
New Zealand policy seems either to be one-off statements at a conference 
or a written response in time of crisis. There is no indication of a lineage 
of New Zealand decisions or statements extending back to before 1944.
 Popular protest faded by late December, but as noted below, Fraser’s 
administration, frustrated by Churchill’s reply, sought further intelligence 
about Greece. In short, they no longer trusted the British imperial diplomatic 
communications.
Churchill sends a message, and New Zealand pursues 
the Greek issue with John Mulgan
Churchill responded to Fraser two days after the latter sent his telegram of 
protest. He did not answer the essential question about the monarchy (not 
even the possibility of a plebiscite was considered) but related developments 
around the issue of appointing a Regent.36 Churchill was pursuing the 
standard British diplomatic practice of ‘consulting’ with the Dominions and 
also demonstrating his single-minded and authoritarian attitude toward them. 
Decision-making was still in the hands of London.37 Obviously, Fraser’s 
diplomatic protest did not cause any change in British policy and actions.
 Frustrated that Churchill’s answer did not address the issues raised, 
Wellington considered other options to gain intelligence about the situation 
in Greece. The surviving records concerning this next phase revolve around 
Wellington-based New Zealand diplomat J.V. Wilson and the Secretary of 
the Department of External Affairs, Alister McIntosh. Given Fraser’s style 
of leadership, it is difficult to consider that he did not have a hand in the 
discussions, especially as General Bernard Freyberg was proposed by Wilson 
as a possible source of political intelligence on the Greek situation. Wilson 
asked McIntosh, whether Freyberg or members of his staff (Geoffrey Cox, 
one of his intelligence officers, was specifically named) should be contacted 
to see if they ‘might have information on the Greek situation which 
would be of use to us?’ He recognized that ‘perhaps in view of General 
Freyberg’s position as one of Field Marshal Alexander’s [Alexander had 
been directing the British operation in Athens] officers, it might not be right 
to communicate with him on the subject’; but that ‘I do not think we can 
neglect any sources of information which we may reasonably consider our 
own’.38 Neither Freyberg nor Cox was contacted. The partnership between 
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Fraser and Freyberg so evident in the New Zealand war history and the 
latter’s assertiveness with his British superiors did not extend to obtaining 
political intelligence on British actions. Instead, Wellington went to John 
Mulgan. Wilson had first met Mulgan when he visited Oxford in the 1930s. 
Later, when Mulgan was part of the New Zealand delegation to the League 
of Nations, they established a bond: ‘J.V. Wilson he warmed to because 
of his surviving Messines and Passchendale, quite apart from his being a 
brilliant classical scholar and a self-effacing, entertaining man’.39 Wilson, 
of External Affairs, worked through a draft letter to send to Mulgan. He 
passed it by McIntosh. On 19 January 1945, a letter was sent to Mulgan 
via 2 NZEF Brigadier Bill Stevens in Egypt. Wilson’s request to Mulgan 
for information on Greece was bundled with a covering letter from Alister 
McIntosh to Stevens. McIntosh wrote: ‘We are anxious, if possible, to get 
some unofficial views on Greece, and Mulgan may, or may not, be able 
to supply us with a few comments’. McIntosh’s vague wording about John 
Mulgan’s military status: ‘I understand he is trying to get a transfer to 
the New Zealand forces’ – leave one wondering whether he was willing 
to transgress the line and ask a serving officer in another army.40 Mulgan 
sent Wilson two letters, less than a week before his death. He was still an 
officer in the British army. Wellington got more than some brief comments. 
Mulgan sent them an extensive report.
 As the opening paragraph of this paper showed, twenty years after Mulgan 
wrote to Wilson, the latter was still cautious about sharing what he had with 
a biographer.41 As indicated earlier, O’Sullivan and McNeish both mention 
the Wilson communication. Wellington’s request to John Mulgan and the 
report have never been analysed in the literature. That Wellington still wanted 
intelligence after ELAS was defeated in Athens and New Zealand popular 
protest evaporated might show some degree of genuine interest in Greek 
affairs. Fraser’s administration had been willing to maintain commonwealth 
solidarity but it was motivated enough to pursue intelligence on an issue 
that had a significant number of New Zealanders protesting.
Mulgan in Athens
On the day that Wilson sent his letter from Wellington, Mulgan had 
already been in Athens for five days. His assignment was to oversee 
claims for compensation from Greeks who had assisted SOE during the 
occupation. Managing this process would bring Mulgan into contact with the 
repercussions of both the death of EKKA’s Psarros and the much-discussed 
Don Stott affair. Stott, a New Zealander, had met with Greek collaborators 
and German functionaries during the occupation. Arguments ensued – and 
have continued ever since – about whether Stott was merely pursuing 
military intelligence or, as EAM/ELAS believed, he was brokering a separate 
agreement with the Germans that did not include them.42 Mulgan was not 
simply involved in the administrative winding down of SOE apparatus and 
compensation claims. While Britain had prevailed in Athens, there were 
acute political tensions that had not been resolved and Mulgan was a player 
in this politically-charged environment. British archive records suggest 
that Britain was seeking and/or maintaining long-term contacts amongst 
the Greeks Mulgan was dealing with. This could mean they were being 
targeted for future intelligence work. In addition, Mulgan was also an actor 
in a security issue that, thanks to his colleague, Julian Dolbey, eventually 
escalated all the way to Winston Churchill.
 The widow of Psarros, the EKKA leader who had been killed by ELAS 
the previous year, submitted one of the claims Mulgan had to evaluate. 
Mulgan and his superior officer, Dolbey, disagreed as to whether or not the 
payment should be paid. Mulgan did not think it should be granted. The 
incorrect and fatal assessment Mulgan and other British Liaison officers made 
the previous year did not apparently lead him to support the wife of the 
dead Psarros. Again, reflecting the ongoing debates concerning Greece, in 
2003 a Greek scholar used the disagreement between the two SOE officers 
to counter a long-held conspiracy theory amongst Greek partisan veterans 
concerning Psarros and EKKA.43 The theory was that EKKA had been a 
pawn of the British. The reasoning, made nearly 60 years after the event 
and using British archives, was that Mulgan and Doleby’s disagreement 
showed that EKKA had not simply been a British stooge.
 Mulgan’s handling of a claim from another Greek, Spyros Kotsis, led 
to Kotsis addressing a nine page letter (written a few days after Mulgan’s 
death) to the British Prime Minister. It was apparently never sent, but was 
analysed by SOE.44 The submission named Stott and asserted that he never 
gave Kostis access to radio sets and funds. Kostis also mentions Stott’s 
Athens episode. Although Stott is only discussed in several paragraphs 
and the compensation case as a whole is full of death, imprisonment and 
accusations of betrayal to the enemy, the fact remains that Mulgan again 
had to contend with the political legacy of the wartime resistance. Kotsis 
wrote, ‘Mr. Mulgan, the representative of the other country [that is, Britain] 
for which I worked with so much sacrifice, cannot reward me with such a 
bitter cup instead of a word of thanks’. He adds later that, unless he receives 
recompense, he will have to commit suicide.45 O’Sullivan’s discussion of 
Kotsis includes the dismissal of the claim. Kotsis, however, pursued his 
accusations against Stott in a book written 31 years after his confrontation 
with Mulgan. His statements concerning Stott’s mission were aired at the 
time of publication and again during a Modern Greek Studies conference 
panel forum in 1978. The latter, at least, attracted some criticism of his 
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claims about Stott. Mulgan’s scepticism about Kotsis was followed decades 
later by similar attitudes by scholars of wartime Greek history.46
 While events from the past were still reverberating in the incidents briefly 
described above, planning for the future shows a continuation of British 
interests. In a communication dated 21 February, Dolbey told Mulgan that the 
latter had to clarify some confusion in his reports from Athens concerning 
a ‘White List’ that was being compiled. The list was ‘intended to cover all 
Greeks who may be usefully employed by British interests. Therefore, the 
fact that a man is at present in employment is no reason why he should 
not be recommended as suitable for employment by a British firm at a 
later date’.47 Given the type of work SOE operatives had been doing, it is 
conceivable that this list might have done more than just providing a labour 
force for a ‘British firm’, as Dolbey says. Certainly in the previous year when 
initial high-level planning (excluding Mulgan, who had not been assigned) 
had begun for the liquidation and compensation operation, commitment to 
those loyal to Britain was such ‘that patriots who are in disfavour with the 
post-war government of their country are given full protection. If necessary, 
SOE would consider using payment from secret funds or evacuation to 
another country’. In the same report, SOE’s clandestine nature meant that, 
in the case of some groups in Athens, they considered (there is no record 
of them doing this) ‘Funds would have to be sent in secretly, which means 
without the knowledge of British authorities who will be in control of the 
area’.48
 In response to SOE’s need for security Mulgan and Dolbey also sought 
ways to stifle newspaper articles in the Greek press concerning British 
intelligence officer David Pawson. Pawson had been one of SOE’s Greek 
experts prior to being captured in the Aegean in late 1943. The information 
at hand is somewhat fragmented, but its tone and the extent of the affair 
adds context to Mulgan’s experiences in Athens. On 14 April, Dolbey wrote 
to Mulgan concerning stories in the Greek newspaper I Vradini. The exact 
content of the stories is not clear, but Dolbey thought that ‘it is undoubtedly 
very dangerous for Pawson’s personal safety and for SOE operations’ 
security’. Hinting at the still-undefeated EAM/ELAS (only Athens had been 
cleared in the aftermath of the December fighting, the rest of the country 
was still largely in their hands), he added ‘you are in the midst of one of 
the political crises which will no doubt succeed one another in Greece for 
the next month or so in preparation for a second show down’.49 From his 
base in Cairo, Dolbey’s escalation of the affair travelled upward to London. 
There, the Foreign Office laid the matter before Churchill. They argued that, 
besides compromising the personal safety of Pawson, the articles aimed 
to threaten British credibility: ‘The intention of the series seems to be to 
criticise British activities in Greece before the liberation’. Churchill approved 
the requested ‘direct action’ for the British military to occupy the paper’s 
offices, shut down the presses and confiscate all copies of the paper.50
 Mulgan’s experiences in Athens show the currents he was swimming in. 
His work resolving claims for compensation – thankless and psychologically 
draining – was accompanied by unresolved and potentially explosive political 
issues. All this took place in a war-devastated land with a dislocated economy 
and a capital city that had just been a battlefield. Although the Varkiza 
agreement had been signed during Mulgan’s time in Athens, it was evident 
that the parties would collide again. Conflict and terror would continue 
intermittently in Greece for years to come.
 Mulgan returned from Athens to Cairo on 19 April. For some reason, the 
delivery of the January letter from Wilson, via Stevens, was not made until 
he returned (both were apparently on the same flight from Greece).51
Mulgan in Cairo and the New Zealand government
Mulgan sent his report for Wilson in a letter dated 22 April. He included 
a separate preliminary note stating that being ‘an army officer I’m not 
officially free to write or express my views without censorship’, but he did 
not think what he was going to write was contentious. He had also written 
a letter two days before confirming receipt of the Wilson correspondence 
and promising a forthcoming report. That report encompasses a range 
of topics concerning the situation in Greece. Its high level of analysis is 
perhaps reflective of Mulgan’s own abilities as well as his feelings about the 
suffering of the Greek people. As he told Wilson in the first letter: ‘This 
has always made me personally a little humble in judging them and a little 
sceptical of wholesale condemnation’. Mulgan also thought his response to 
Wilson may have been too late and the need no longer as great.52 This was 
only partially true, in the sense that Wilson had access to some of the New 
Zealand soldier’s assessment since February. Mulgan’s father had provided 
Wilson with extracts from letters sent by his son to his parents (John was 
apparently unaware of this). They were from letters dated from 5 December 
1944 until 21 January 1945 – that is, from the time fighting broke out in 
Athens until the time when John Mulgan returned there on his compensation 
work. Alan Mulgan included a note to Wilson with the first consignment 
of extracts, sent on 30 January. He told the diplomat: ‘They are for your 
perusal alone’ and that ‘I think you will agree that in the circumstances his 
sequence of comments should remain, as intended, for private consumption, 
though they may be useful for forming opinions’.53 Alan Mulgan sent a 
second extract a month later in late February. Wilson circulated all the 
material to Alister McIntosh and other staff in the administration. Peter 
Fraser does not appear in the archives trail.
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 The extracts show John Mulgan was critical of British foreign policy: 
‘The British Government has been consistently wrong’ and its ‘policy is so 
tortuous and the issues so mixed up that I’d rather not be associated with 
it’. The Greek communists receive a particularly savage assessment: ‘The 
communists, of course, are bloody. I’ve seen enough of them at close quarters 
now to have a thorough distrust of their methods’. They also, Mulgan wrote, 
happily promote ‘the theory that suffering and starvation are useful for the 
revolutionary situation that they produce’.54
 The extract from the most recently dated letter (21 January) given 
to Wilson shows a John Mulgan more focused on the problems of his 
compensation work and the plight of civilians. This is understandable as 
most of the fighting in Athens had subsided by this time. Despite what had 
happened and his continued criticism of the communists, Mulgan was not 
inclined to totally discount EAM/ELAS: ‘The British on the other hand 
won’t admit that there might be any good people in these left movements 
and I’m likely to get arrested for even suggesting such a thing’.55
 The information contained in the letters John Mulgan set to his family 
undoubtedly gave Wilson and his colleagues grounding in John Mulgan’s 
views about Greece. Mulgan’s response to the Wilson/McIntosh approach 
provided more details. Individual personalities are sketched in the briefing 
paper Mulgan sent Wilson (for example, EAM/ELAS leaders such as George 
Siantos and Aris Velouchiotis, Zervas of EDES and Churchill). Even the 
briefest asides contain evaluations that are politically provocative. They also 
carry the credibility of being written by a serving officer who had extensive 
experience in the field. One would also have to place the communication in 
the context of coming after the recent fighting in Athens and amongst the 
still-unresolved political issues.
 Mulgan’s criticism continued to be directed across the political spectrum. 
He felt that Britain was acting like an imperial power trying to control 
an independent country, while ELAS was using unscrupulous methods of 
intimidation and terror and was undemocratic to the extent of being ‘the 
fascism of the Left’.56 Their military effort against the Axis enemy was 
negligible. Partly, Mulgan recognized, this was a deliberate strategy to 
conserve their forces until the day of liberation – and anticipated revolution. 
The leadership of the Greek communist movement lends itself to accusations 
that they manipulated a situation to foster discontent and revolution. Mulgan 
differentiates between those communists doing the fighting (ELAS partisan 
leader Aris Vekouchiotis is named) and those directing it – the latter ‘stayed 
in the background but had all the power’. He is also somewhat cynical of 
the communist leadership who had avoided being directly involved in the 
bloodshed. Hence, Siantos and Pantselides ‘were circulating happily in 
Athens’, while Karageorgos was reporting on the United Nations conference 
in San Francisco.57
 The political dynamics of wartime Greece show a more complex vista 
than that of polarized communists versus supporters of the British-backed 
monarchy and government in exile. Support for the respective sides varied, 
but Mulgan notes: ‘Up till the time of civil war [that is, probably the ‘First 
Round’ that started in October 1943] a voting majority of Greece would have 
been Venizelist left-wing liberals. Most of the men that I met and worked 
with in ELAS were of this kind, and I think they represented a general 
and predominant part of the country’.58 Reflecting on the continual wartime 
symbiosis between the forces within and external to Greece, Mulgan also 
states that the mutinies of the Greek armed forces in the Middle East were 
organized by former Greek operatives employed by the British to make 
contact with resistance groups. They were ‘now imprisoned in the Sudan.’59 
The statement, again, could have been a source of embarrassment to the 
British if it were ever made public.
 Mulgan’s assessment of Napoleon Zervas, the head of EDES and Britain’s 
ally in the resistance movement, is worth analysing in some detail. Mulgan 
was possibly in a position to know more about the state of the partisan 
leader’s personal finances than most. Zervas, according to Mulgan, ‘has not 
been impoverished by the war’. Although ‘It was a mistake nevertheless to 
lean heavily upon him or build him up as the leader of a non-communist 
resistance movement’, he was ‘a good natural guerilla leader and the type 
of cheerful scoundrel that it pays to employ in war-time.’ Mulgan, although 
criticizing British foreign policy, still had a balanced opinion of Zervas.
 However, his knowledge of the British ally’s personal financial situation at 
a time when the whole country was in economic ruin requires exploration. 
A little more than three months before Mulgan wrote his letter to Wilson, 
Tom Barnes, a New Zealand officer on special service with SOE and attached 
to EDES, had bitterly observed in an official report (by its circulation list 
not apparently given directly to Wellington, but a copy sits in the New 
Zealand archives) that Zervas was having difficulty in meeting debts. EDES 
creditors ‘were a common and unwelcome sight’.60 His partisans ‘were in a 
sorry plight. They had received no clothes for months and were in rags . . . 
they received barely sufficient food to live on – this did not include olive oil, 
soap etc. without which they cannot live. They received no money in order 
to buy such necessities’.61 The usefulness of EDES was now at an end and, 
as such, they were being treated cynically by the British, who had cut off 
their financial support. They had been formally disbanded on 16 February. 
SOE often argued that Napoleon Zervas was a soldier of fortune with little 
or no ostensible political convictions during the war. However, Zervas did 
indeed enter politics in 1945 and became a Minister in a postwar government 
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that fought the communists (by then termed ‘bandits’ by their Greek and 
British opponents). More than four years after EDES had been disbanded, 
its apparent (the British never seemed to verify the correspondent’s bona 
fides) wartime Director General of the Financial Services wrote to the 
British Embassy of Greece and also to the House of Commons,62 refuting 
claims by a British MP that Zervas was ‘an “adventurer” [and] cost Britain 
30,000,000 gold sovereigns’, arguing that the amount was an ‘incredible 
sum’ in the context of the financial breakdown he provided.63 The extent 
of Zervas’ pecuniary motivations while working with the British was still 
a sensitive issue. Mulgan’s comment about Zervas not ending the war as a 
poor man would have undoubtedly added credibility at least to accusations 
of profiteering. Given the situation in Greece, any disclosure like this would 
have led to public outcry and embarrassment for Britain. It would stir the 
embers of open revolt.
 Probably the most provocative statement made by Mulgan, a still-serving 
British officer, concerned hypothetical political choices he would make. 
He dismisses the rightists who were then forming a succession of Greek 
governments. The only viable alternative, he argued, was the communists. 
He wrote:
The Communist party in Greece has a good future, with or without 
Russian support, because it has a good organisation and discipline and 
knows where it is going. If I were a young man in Greece now, I would 
be tempted to join it with the idea of trying to ameliorate it from within. 
Its top men are good but the middle men, the local commissars and 
village thugs, are the worst type and need liquidating if anyone does in 
the brave new world. One would be tempted to join it, not with any love 
for it or belief in its doctrine but mainly from despair with its antithesis 
on the right and thinking cynically that the party would be likely to 
come to power sooner or later and that it would be as well to get on 
good terms with it now.
Given the sensitivity of the Pawson case mentioned previously, one could 
imagine the reaction such a view would elicit if made public. It is also telling 
that Mulgan, when considering joining the communists, entertained using 
the same methods he himself loathed about them – that is, liquidation. The 
ends for him justified the means. The statement also lies in stark contrast 
to his general sense of humanity, expressed in his sympathies toward the 
Greek people. Both of these elements have figured highly in the published 
record.
 What Wilson and the Wellington administration thought of Mulgan’s letter 
has not been located in the primary sources. However, one New Zealander 
used it, amongst other information, to argue John Mulgan had been killed 
in Cairo rather than having committed suicide. This was John Mulgan’s 
father, Alan.
Possibility of assassination is raised by Alan Mulgan
Mulgan wrote his report for Wilson and Wellington just a few days before 
being found dead in his hotel room in Cairo. Disbelief and frustration ensued 
among his family in New Zealand and England (where his uncle lived). 
Mulgan’s position as a serving officer with the British forces and the fact 
that SOE were in the midst of dismantling their administrative structures 
in Cairo exacerbated the family’s difficulty in obtaining information. The 
family also sought information through unofficial channels. Given the nature 
of his work and the content of the letters Mulgan had written to both his 
parents and Wilson, it is not surprising that the possibility of assassination 
was raised. The trials of the Mulgan family in gaining specifics of their 
son’s death and the extended investigation (the first investigation could not 
come to a unanimous conclusion and so a second was initiated) has been 
discussed in biographies of Mulgan. Mulgan’s commanding officer rejected 
the possibility of suicide at the first enquiry and this has been interpreted as 
an accession to Mulgan’s note asking him to try and conceal the suicide.64 
The possibility of assassination has been obliquely mentioned by O’Sullivan: 
‘there were rumours, especially in Greek circles, of sinister undercover 
possibilities’.65
 Alan Mulgan first raised the question of assassination in a letter to Peter 
Fraser on 21 August 1945. Alan Mulgan was a well known and respected 
author and journalist. Between 1935 and 1946, he was responsible for radio 
talks on the New Zealand Broadcasting Service. He was also an anglophile 
– his entry in the Oxford Companion to New Zealand Literature attributes 
him with ‘late-Victorian moral conservatism, Empire loyalty and a sense of 
England as ‘home’.66 As the January letter from Wilson-McIntosh to John 
Mulgan indicated, Alan was known personally to Wilson the diplomat. With 
his position, connections and literary standing, it could be argued that he was 
not just a member of the general public but of the establishment elite.67
 During the remainder of the year, Alan Mulgan pursued the assassination 
theme in several letters to Alister McIntosh, Fraser’s Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs. He asked Fraser himself why the enquiries 
in Cairo still continued. A delay in the findings made him propose that there 
was some doubt about the actual cause. More pointedly, he speculated that 
John Mulgan had fallen victim to political violence: ‘There is ample reason 
to suppose, however, that to many individuals and political factions, John 
was a dangerous man, and Greek politics are notorious for intolerance and 
vindictiveness’. The manuscript of John Mulgan’s Report on Experience was 
also mentioned, as was the report to J.V. Wilson. Alan Mulgan knew not 
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only of the report but also of its contents. He argued: ‘As you will agree, 
this confidential report was highly dangerous if seen or known of by any of 
those he wrote of so frankly and critically’. There was also the possibility 
that the Greeks had John Mulgan under surveillance. Mulgan senior wanted 
Fraser’s help in making this political perspective and the existence of the 
mentioned documents known to the authorities (both British Army and 
Egyptian civil ones) in Cairo. He also raised the possibility that a particular 
decision concerning his son’s death might have been deliberately reached to 
‘avoid adding to international complications at such a time’. He specifically 
considers that Greek partisans would have wanted to avoid publication of 
his son’s manuscript and that ‘some of the Greeks may have found this 
out and been watching him’. It is not surprising that Alan Mulgan, a well 
know Anglophile, would speculate that the Greeks had dispensed with his 
son rather than the British (of whom John had been also been critical). He 
suggested that it was ‘Greeks’, rather than a specific group (such as ELAS 
partisans) or individual (such as Zervas or any of the communists), who 
may have killed his son. Unlike John, Alan Mulgan was imprecise (possibly 
deliberately) in his communication concerning Greek politics.
 Alan Mulgan’s fears might be seen in part as the natural reaction of a 
grieving father who refused to believe his son would commit suicide – such 
a proposition he wrote was ‘quite fantastic’. He did, however, support his 
assertion with a quote from a letter written by SOE colleague Tom Barnes 
to John Mulgan’s wife about how well Mulgan had looked the day before his 
death.68 If Alan Mulgan had been aware at the time that, on 30 April, the 
New Zealand Maadi Camp in Cairo had told the HQ of the 2 NZEF that John 
Mulgan’s ‘Cause of death [is] not yet known but foul play is suspected’,69 he 
would undoubtedly have questioned the suicide finding even more forcefully. 
Alan Mulgan pursued the possibility of assassination in another letter on 
4 September, written to McIntosh. Again, he dismissed the idea of suicide, 
and stressed his son’s character, including a letter from Geoff Cox, a friend 
of John Mulgan and the intelligence officer that Wilson thought earlier they 
might contact instead of Mulgan. He pressed for Wellington to question 
other figures who might be able to provide additional information. One was 
a Greek who had typed part of the Report on Experience manuscript. He 
quoted a letter from his son: ‘an odd little Greek typed the first part’. Alan 
Mulgan thought: ‘This is the sort of evidence that would probably not be 
known to the authorities in Cairo’. Another possible source of information 
was an officer from Dunedin who had worked with John Mulgan during 
the relief operations to newly liberated Greece. Finally, there was a British 
officer with the British Embassy in Greece. Alan Mulgan suggested avenues 
to pursue but left the Wellington government to decide (or act). He then 
moved to a more specific claim – that it might be the Egyptians who 
wanted to cover up a politically motivated crime.70 The final letter was 
written on 2 December. Having received, at McIntosh’s request, the final 
official report on his son’s death from General Bill Stevens, Alan Mulgan 
raised the possible political motives as well as ‘John’s domestic affairs’ 
(undoubtedly referring to his romantic affairs which were included in the 
initial investigation and named as the reason for suicide). Regarding the 
former, he included information he had obtained from Tom Barnes, that 
Communists had murdered several people in Cairo and reiterated that ‘it was 
apparently not known in Cairo that John had written on political conditions 
in Greece’.71 Alan Mulgan was both introducing his son’s personal life as 
well as being more specific about which Greeks might have killed his son. 
His earlier singular view about the political dimension had been diluted, but 
at the same time, he had made his allegation more precise by specifically 
naming Greek communists as the perpetrators.
 Records show that Fraser’s government pursued information on the process 
and outcomes of investigations into Mulgan’s death,72 and Fraser told General 
Bernard Freyberg to verify that the investigation and proceedings73 were all 
in order. But there is no indication that the government ever passed on to 
the investigating authorities any information about the political writings of 
John Mulgan – either in the form of letters to his family or the report he 
sent to Wilson.
 The subsequent scholarly work on Mulgan and my own research using 
British and New Zealand archives make the official verdict of suicide seem 
more plausible than the argument for political assassination. The intimacy 
of the suicide note John Mulgan left his commanding officer, including the 
use of the term ‘liquidation’ to describe his own demise – a word which 
they had often used in their compensation work – is something an assassin 
could not duplicate. There were no signs of any struggle or any evidence of a 
forced external entry into his room or visitors. That a grieving family should 
think John Mulgan had been dispatched for political reasons is unsurprising. 
His report to Wilson, family correspondence and the explosive experiences 
of December 1944 would all contribute to such a view. Whether or not the 
investigation and official finding of suicide would have been influenced by 
the information Alan Mulgan wanted the Wellington government to forward 
to Egypt is pure conjecture. Much more certain is that the Fraser government 
avoided political embarrassment by not informing the investigating British 
of their unofficial correspondence with John Mulgan.
Conclusion
John Mulgan was engaged in politically charged activities in relation to 
wartime Greece. His pre-war connection with the Wellington administration 
and their recognition of his analytical abilities led them to seek out 
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his analysis of newly liberated Greece. The actions of Peter Fraser’s 
government to obtain intelligence independent of the standard commonwealth 
apparatus – in response to domestic pressure – show the accepted view in 
the literature of implicit New Zealand neutrality is somewhat erroneous. 
The New Zealand administration’s reluctance to pursue requests to send 
Mulgan’s communications to the investigating authorities in Egypt, however, 
demonstrates the limits to which it was prepared to engage in action 
independent of London.
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